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ARTICLE I JUDGES IN AN ARTICLE III 
WORLD: THE CAREER PATH OF 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon* 
Federal magistrate judges are a relatively new creation, officially dating back 
only to 1968 in a federal judicial system which dates to 1789. Unlike federal district 
and appellate judges, whose constitutional authority is rooted in Article III, federal 
magistrate judges are a creation of Congress through Article I. Since their incep-
tion as special masters, magistrate judges’ responsibilities have steadily grown, 
now presiding (with the parties’ consent) over civil as well as misdemeanor crim-
inal trials. The institutional differences between magistrate and district judges are 
stark: selection, compensation, and tenure, to name a few. At the same time, the 
roles of these judges significantly overlap, and district courts vary in the power 
and deference granted to magistrate judges. Notwithstanding their importance in 
federal adjudication, our understanding of magistrate judges remains limited. This 
article attempts to increase our understanding by building a unique dataset that 
comprises the universe of sitting United States magistrate judges, capturing both 
biographical and professional characteristics. We find that magistrate judges 
come from more diverse educational and professional backgrounds than do district 
judges. The implications of this finding are significant because magistrate judges 
exercise greater decision-making discretion in federal courts and serve as a pipe-
line to the Article III judiciary. 
INTRODUCTION 
Magistrate judges are one of the most important, but least-understood, ele-
ments of the federal judiciary. Their responsibilities are not defined by the U.S. 
Constitution, which establishes a federal judicial branch in Article III. Acting 
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pursuant to its Article I authority, Congress created the position in 1968 when it 
authorized, rather than mandating, the appointment of federal “magistrates.”1 
Nearly fifty years later, Congress has defined magistrate judges’ possible duties 
largely (though not entirely) in the negative:2 Magistrate judges may be asked by 
district courts to undertake any task “not explicitly prohibited by statute or by 
the Constitution.”3 Notwithstanding the limited formal grant of specific authority 
from Congress, federal magistrate judges have grown dramatically in number 
and influence over the last half-century.4 
The impact of magistrate judges is substantial whether measured in the raw 
number of cases in which they are involved or in the nature of the work that they 
do. Magistrate judges disposed of over one million judicial matters in 2012, in-
volving both criminal and civil cases, ranging from preliminary proceedings to 
bench and jury trials.5 To place these numbers in context, district judges—who 
                                                        
1  Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 60, 631–639 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401–3402 (2012)) (establishing the position 
of magistrate within the federal judicial system); Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 643 
(1968) (expanding prospective powers of magistrate judges and creating merit selection panels 
to aid district courts in selection of magistrate judges); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (formal title change to magistrate judge). 
2  28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012) (directly assigning relatively minor powers to magistrate judges—
such as entering a sentence for a petty offense or Class A misdemeanor with parties’ consent—
but authorizing much larger grants of authority by district judges in the district court where 
the magistrate judges serve). 
3  Id. § 636(b) (allowing district judges to designate magistrate judges to handle a wide range 
of matters and concluding a list of such matters with a broad right to assign “such additional 
duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States”); see also 
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 863 (1989). 
4  Kevin Koller, Note, Deciphering De Novo Determinations: Must District Courts Review 
Objections Not Raised Before a Magistrate Judge?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2011) 
(“Since Congress first enacted the Federal Magistrates Act in 1968, both the size and the scope 
of the federal magistrate system have steadily grown to the point of ubiquity.”). 
5  Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges During the 12-Month Periods Ending Sep-
tember 30, 2002, and September 30, 2008 Through 2012, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/s-17/judicial-business/2012/09/30 [https://perma.cc/ 
TWD6-W9XQ] (showing that magistrate judges disposed of 1,068,153 cases in 2012). 
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outnumber magistrate judges in terms of authorized positions6 and actual num-
bers7—disposed of 364,149 cases during the same year.8 Furthermore, magistrate 
judges’ rulings and recommendations occur at every phase of litigation, includ-
ing settlement negotiations and across a wide array of disputes.9 
As crucial a role as magistrate judges play in the functioning of the federal 
judiciary, surprisingly little is known about them.10 The imbalance between im-
portance and information is likely the result of the source of their authority as 
well as the process of their selection. Although Congress formally defines the 
scope of magistrate judicial responsibilities, the appointing district court effec-
tively controls the grant of actual authority to magistrate judges in their district.11 
Local rules reveal that the delegation of responsibility varies considerably within 
and across judicial districts, corresponding to the demands and preferences of 
their respective district judges.12 Unlike their Article III counterparts who un-
dergo a public confirmation process, magistrate judges are selected by district 
                                                        
6  See History of the Federal Judiciary: Magistrate Judgeships, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http:// 
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_magistrate.html [https://perma.cc/V57N-4D6S] 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (“As of March 2009, there are 517 full-time authorized magistrate 
judgeships and 42 part-time authorized magistrate judgeships.”) [hereinafter History]. The 
number of magistrate judges is set by the Judicial Conference of the United States but contin-
gent on congressional funding of the positions. Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/D4WH-
4WRW] (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). For the district courts, since 2002, there have been 667 
authorized judgeships. Id. 
7  Sitting district judges include both active judges (appointees to authorized seats) and senior 
judges (appointees who have retired from their seat, freeing it for a new appointment, but still 
hearing cases). 
8  See United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. CTS. (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2012/12/31-
3 [https://perma.cc/V9VK-TYYB]. 
9  See, e.g., Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 661 (2005) (explaining the increased role played by magistrate judges 
in the judicial scheme); Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispen-
sable:” The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past 
Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845 (2016); Koller, supra note 4 (“Since Congress first enacted 
the Federal Magistrates Act in 1968, both the size and the scope of the federal magistrate 
system have steadily grown to the point of ubiquity.”). 
10  See generally Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present but Unaccounted 
for, 16 NEV. L.J. 783 (2016). 
11  See, e.g., J. Anthony Downs, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of Final Deci-
sionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1032, 1034 (1985); Judith Resnik, 
The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspi-
rations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605–08 (1998). 
12  See, e.g., Samiyyah R. Ali, Maxwell A. Sills & Tracey E. George, The Illusion of Uni-
formity: The Proliferation of Local Procedural Rules in Federal Trial Court (working paper, 
May 2016, available from authors) (reporting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, which 
addresses the magistrate judge issuance of pre-trial orders, has spawned the largest set of local 
rules). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (2012) (“Each district court shall establish rules pursu-
ant to which the magistrate judges shall discharge their duties.”). 
GEORGE - 16 NEV. L.J. 823 - FINAL 7/22/2016  11:11 AM 
826 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:823  
court judges through a non-public process.13 Perhaps for this reason, the compo-
sition of federal magistrate bench, including background and attributes such as 
age, gender, ethnicity, schooling, and prior legal experience, remains largely un-
known. 
The magistrate judge statutes, then, grant substantial authority—indeed 
nearly unfettered—to district judges who have discretion in both the selection 
and the responsibilities of magistrate judges. The logic is apparent: Since district 
judges will be relying on magistrate judges to assist them in their Article III work, 
district judges have an incentive to pick effective magistrate judges. However, 
the question remains as to whom they should choose. The statute and Judicial 
Conference regulations state few formal requirements. Even the specified pre-
requisites are minimal given the stature of the position: a candidate must be 
younger than seventy, be a member in good standing of the jurisdiction’s state 
bar for at least five years, and have at least five years of legal professional expe-
rience.14 Most (if not all) serious candidates would satisfy these criteria. Thus, 
the district courts have wide latitude in identifying and choosing magistrate 
judges—nearly as much discretion as with their selection of their chambers staff. 
The purpose of this article is to increase our understanding of magistrate 
judges by examining who is chosen as a magistrate judge. As part of our broader 
project on magistrate judges, we have constructed a unique biographical dataset 
of current active magistrate judges. This data allows us to observe how the de-
mographic characteristics of magistrate judges vary within and across federal 
judicial districts, and how they compare with their district judge counterparts. 
To analogize from baseball, magistrate judges are a bit like setup pitchers. 
Both perform a myriad of important assignments without much fanfare. The in-
fusion of advanced statistics (sabermetrics) into baseball has allowed managers, 
fans, and players themselves to better appreciate these types of pitchers.15 This 
paper is part of a broader research enterprise to better understand the many con-
tributions of magistrate judges. 
This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly describe the history of 
magistrate judges. In Part II, we review the existing literature on magistrate 
judges. Part III presents our key findings about the attributes and backgrounds of 
federal district and magistrate judges. We conclude by considering the implica-
tions of our findings and identifying future research questions. 
                                                        
13  28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE SELECTION, 
APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES, at i, 61 (2010). 
14  28 U.S.C. § 631. The law also bars nepotism by prohibiting the appointment of a person 
who is related “by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin” to a judge of the 
appointing district court. Id. § 458. This rule appears to reflect concerns about abuse of the 
discretion afforded to the district judges in selecting magistrate judges rather than concerns 
about family members serving together on a court because no similar rule applies to appoint-
ment of Article III judges. Indeed, there have been many instances of family members serving 
on the same court and in superior-inferior courts. 
15  See, e.g., Phil Birnbaum, A Guide to Sabermetric Research, SOC’Y FOR AM. BASEBALL RES., 
http://sabr.org/sabermetrics [https://perma.cc/4LRK-MS8H] (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES: SELECTION AND WORK 
Congress created magistrate judges when it passed the Federal Magistrates 
Act of 1968.16 The Act abolished the Office of the U.S. Commissioner in favor 
of creating magistrates, which congress believed would allow for more efficient 
judicial administration.17 For example, prior to the Act, district judges spent 
much of their time deciding minor criminal matters because the commissioner 
could hear only petty offense misdemeanors committed on federal reservations.18 
These formal constraints led district judges to downgrade crimes so that they 
could be heard by commissioners, or decline to prosecute other offenses alto-
gether.19 Magistrates were established under Congress’s Article I powers rather 
than under its Article III powers; thus, the selection process is not the familiar 
Article III one, but instead a statutorily created process which has changed over 
time. We begin by considering the evolution in the way magistrate judges are 
appointed. We then turn to the dramatic increase in the breadth and depth of 
responsibilities delegated to magistrate judges in at least some districts. Under-
standing both the selection and work of magistrate judges is important to our 
examination of who serves as a magistrate judge. 
A. The Selection Process for Magistrate Judges 
In the beginning, district courts varied in how they selected magistrate 
judges (then known as magistrates). When Congress replaced the U.S. commis-
sioners with the new magistrate position in 1968, Congress delegated to district 
judges the sole discretion over the selection process—which led some districts 
to select by collective agreement, and others to leave the decision entirely to the 
chief judge or individual district judges.20 In practice, often the chief judge or 
another interested judge would advocate for the appointment of a lawyer with 
whom one or more of the district’s judges had already established a positive 
working or personal relationship, such as a law clerk or an Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney.21 Thus, magistrates were often chosen principally based on familiarity rather 
than an objective evaluation of qualifications. 
Over the subsequent decade, litigators and other repeat players voiced con-
cern over the uneven quality of magistrate appointees across districts and lobbied 
Congress to impose standards on the process.22 Congress responded with the 
                                                        
16  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). 
17  See id.; see also Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of the United 
States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, 5–7 (1999). 
18  See S. REP. NO. 371, at 10 (1967). 
19  See id. 
20  See Christopher E. Smith, Merit Selection Committees and the Politics of Appointing 
United States Magistrates, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 210, 212 (1987). 
21  Id. 
22  PETER G. MCCABE, FED. BAR. ASS’N, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
SYSTEM 13 (2014). 
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Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, requiring the creation of district-based merit se-
lection committees, which would recommend candidates for magistrate.23 This 
merit selection process was intended to diversify and upgrade the caliber of ap-
pointees by widening the pool of applicants to include all interested and qualified 
applicants and ensuring a rigorous and objective evaluation process.24 The 1979 
changes to the magistrate judicial selection method, which were the most recent 
statutory revisions, may be divided into those focused on who can serve and those 
focused on how they are selected. 
1. Magistrate Judge Qualifications 
The 1979 Act sets forth five minimum qualifications for a magistrate 
judge:25 
1. The candidate must be a member in good standing of the bar for the state 
in which the district court is located and have been such a member for 
at least five years.26 
2. The candidate must be younger than seventy when first appointed.27 
3. The candidate may not be related by blood or marriage to a judge of the 
appointing district court by affinity or consanguinity within the degree 
of first cousin.28 
4. The candidate must live in the district or, if the appointment is to serve 
in a national park, the candidate must reside within the exterior bounda-
ries of that park, or at least some place reasonably adjacent thereto.29 
5. The candidate must be competent to perform the duties of the office by 
the appointing district court.30 
The U.S. Judicial Conference, pursuant to its authority under the Act, has 
supplemented these criteria by requiring that a candidate have practiced law for 
at least five years and by adding to the single merit criterion in the federal law.31 
As to the former, “practice” experience may include traditional practice with a 
                                                        
23  See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(2) (2012). 
24  Foschio, supra note 17, at 6. 
25  28 U.S.C. §§ 631(b)(1)–(5), (d). 
26  Id. § 631(b)(1). Although the term “member in good standing” is not defined in any statu-
tory provisions applicable to magistrate judges, state law generally governs the requirements 
for being in good standing. See id. The bar membership requirement can be waived for part-
time magistrate judges. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 9. 
27  28 U.S.C. § 631(d) (“[N]o person may serve under this chapter after having attained the 
age of seventy years.”). 
28  Id. § 631(b)(4) (“He is not related by blood or marriage to a judge of the appointing court 
or courts at the time of his initial appointment.”). 
29  Id. § 631(b)(3) (“In the case of an individual appointed to serve in a national park, he resides 
within the exterior boundaries of that park, or at some place reasonably adjacent thereto.”). 
30  Id. § 631(b)(2) (“He is determined by the appointing district court or courts to be competent 
to perform the duties of the office.”). 
31  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REGULATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES ESTABLISHING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND 
REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES § 1.01(b) (2010). 
GEORGE - 16 NEV. L.J. 823 - FINAL 7/22/2016  11:11 AM 
Summer 2016] ARTICLE I JUDGES IN AN ARTICLE III WORLD 829 
private or public employer as well as other positions such as work as a judge, 
attorney for a federal or state agency, judicial clerkship, and similar activities. 
The more meaningful, but ambiguous, requirements are that a candidate must 
possess “good moral character, emotionally stable and mature, committed to 
equal justice under the law, in good health, patient, courteous, and capable of 
deliberation and decisiveness when required to act on his or her own reason and 
judgment.”32 Finally, the Conference allows district courts to establish additional 
requirements if designed to serve the specific responsibilities handled by the 
magistrate judges in that district.33 
2. Magistrate Judicial Selection Process 
The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 dictates the basic framework governing 
federal magistrate judge selection and delegates to the United States Judicial 
Conference the responsibility of promulgating additional standards and proce-
dures.34 The Act and regulations set forth a multi-stage process for the appoint-
ment of magistrate judges. In order to assist district courts in the selection (and 
to ensure consistency with the governing law), the Administrative Conference of 
the U.S. Courts periodically publishes a guidebook to assist district courts and 
the merit selection panels appointed by them in navigating the selection process 
for magistrate judges.35 
The formal selection process for a magistrate judge position begins with the 
district court widely circulating a required announcement that there is a magis-
trate judge vacancy and soliciting applications.36 District courts have some lati-
tude in how they advertise as long as the method chosen is designed to reach and 
attract as many qualified applicants as possible.37 The announcement describes 
                                                        
32  Id. 
33  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 420.10.20 (“A district 
court may establish additional qualification standards appropriate for a particular magistrate 
judge position, taking into account the specific responsibilities anticipated for that position. In 
no event, however, may the additional qualification standards be inconsistent with the court’s 
policy as an equal opportunity employer.”). 
34  28 U.S.C. § 631 (“The judges of each United States district court . . . shall appoint United 
States magistrate judges . . . the appointment, whether an original appointment or a reappoint-
ment, shall be by the concurrence of a majority of all judges of such district court, and when 
there is no such concurrence, then by the chief judge . . . . [The magistrate judge shall be] 
selected pursuant to standards and procedures promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.”); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at i–ii, app. I.I. 
35  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13. 
36  28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (“He is selected pursuant to standards and procedures promulgated 
by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Such standards and procedures shall contain 
provision for public notice of all vacancies in magistrate judge positions.”). 
37  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, § 2.01 (The Judicial Conference regula-
tions call for the circulation to “reach a wide audience of qualified individuals” and suggest 
placing the vacancy announcement in the “general local newspaper; a widely circulated local 
legal periodical; bar association web sites; government web sites; and other sources relied 
upon by legal professionals.”). 
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the duties of the position to be filled, gives qualification standards and salary, 
states the term in office (eight years for full-time)38, and outlines application pro-
cedures.39 Candidates must apply directly, rather than relying on nomination, in 
order to demonstrate their willingness to serve if selected.40 Applications are 
strictly confidential and the identity of applicants as well as consideration of ap-
plications are not released.41 
A merit selection panel, whose membership is public, screens the applica-
tions. The district judges, by majority vote, names this panel. It must have seven 
or more citizens, including at least two non-lawyers, and may be ad hoc or stand-
ing.42 All panelists must live in, or “have significant ties to,” the district.43 None 
can be an active, senior, or retired federal judge or an employee of the district 
court.44 Current (and recent) panelists cannot also be candidates for the magis-
trate judgeship (although waivers are possible).45 The law imposes no other re-
strictions on who can serve on the panel, leaving a great deal of discretion with 
local district courts. An early empirical study of the panels found that “[t]he lack 
of regulations . . . has resulted in the creation of panels that reflects [district] 
judges’ diverse conceptions of the merit process.”46 Based on interviews and sur-
veys of a sample of district judges, magistrate judges, and panelists, the study 
author concluded that most merit panels were either Blue Ribbon (elites who had 
relationships with district judges) or Representative (diverse membership).47 In 
a small number of districts, each district judge names one or more panelists (la-
beled “Proxy” panels). 
Beyond the stated criteria, the statute and regulations offer little guidance as 
to how panels should evaluate applicants. As a result, the individual panels gen-
erally formulate their own internal selection procedures.48 The panel must act by 
majority vote, but has discretion over open versus secret ballots and quorum 
                                                        
38  28 U.S.C. § 631(e). 
39  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, § 2.02. 
40  Id. (The Judicial Conference regulations state, “The notice should specify that applications 
are to be submitted only by the applicant personally, indicating the person’s willingness to 
serve if selected.”). 
41  Id. § 3.03. 
42  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 33, §§ 420.30.10–420.30.20(c). The require-
ment concerning the number of lawyers versus non-lawyers comes exclusively from the Judi-
cial Conference regulations. Id. 
43  28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (the requirement that the individuals composing the merit selection 
panel be residents of the pertinent district comes from the Federal Magistrate Act); ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 17, app. J. 
44  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, § 3.02 (required by the Judicial Confer-
ence regulations). 
45  Id. 
46  Smith, supra note 20, at 216. 
47  Id. at 216–23, 217 (Table 1). 
48  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 21–22; Smith, supra note 20, at 
216–29. 
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rules.49 The panel must review all applications, although they may delegate that 
the initial review to a subset of the panel.50 The panel may, but is not required to, 
conduct interviews.51 The Judicial Conference requires only that the panel ensure 
that the candidates meet the stated requirements and that they “designate those 
individuals whom the panel considers best qualified.”52 The Administrative Of-
fice encourages the panel to make that assessment based on each applicant’s ac-
ademic record and related scholastic achievements in law school and college, 
how long the applicant has practiced law and the type of legal practice, and the 
applicant’s familiarity with the rules and procedures of the federal court sys-
tem.53 The Administrative Office advocates for “some degree of uniformity” as 
“essential in the selection process,” but acknowledges that the process is suffi-
ciently flexible that uniformity may not be possible.54 
Within ninety days of its creation, the merit selection panel submits to the 
district court a confidential report, which includes the names of the five best-
qualified applicants and an analysis of their qualifications.55 The panel may 
choose to rank the candidates or list them without preference.56 The report must 
include all written materials received or prepared as part of the panel’s process.57 
At this point, the merit panel’s work is done unless the court rejects all of the 
five people on the list. In such an event, the panel will submit a second list of 
five names.58 
The district judges select the new magistrate judge by majority vote from the 
merit panel’s list of five (or ten, if no name on the initial list garners a majority 
vote).59 The court may not consider names outside the list. However, it can con-
duct an additional inquiry into the named candidates’ qualifications.60 If the dis-
trict judges cannot choose a magistrate judge after receiving two lists, then the 
chief judge appoints one of the panel’s nominees to the open seat.61 
                                                        
49  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 21–22; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., supra note 33, § 420.30.30(c). 
50  See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 33, § 420.30.30(d); see also ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 21–22. 
51  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 22; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., supra note 33, § 420.30.30(d). 
52  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 33, § 420.30.30. 
53  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 26–27. 
54  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13 at 27. 
55  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, §§ 3.01–.04; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 29–30. 
56  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 30. 
57  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13 at 29–30. 
58  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, § 4.01; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 32. 
59  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 32. 
60  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13 at 31–34. 
61  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, § 4.01. 
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Magistrate judges, like bankruptcy and tax judges, are Article I judges and 
are subject to both statutory62 and constitutional63 constraints. Article I judges 
receive neither the lifetime tenure64 nor salary guarantees65 afforded to Article 
III judges.66 They serve eight-year terms, and are eligible for re-appointment.67 
A comparison of the method for choosing the two sets of district court judi-
cial officers is enlightening. The two figures below show the stages for the Arti-
cle III selection process and the magistrate judicial selection process. Obviously, 
the method of selection is likely to impact who serves. What is less clear is what 
differences we will see in the visible qualifications of each group. 
                                                        
62  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). 
63  See Downs, supra note 11 (noting that Article I judges’ constitutional protections differ 
from Article III judges). 
64  See History, supra note 6. Magistrate judges serve an eight-year term, eligible for succes-
sive reappointment. Id. 
65  28 U.S.C. §§ 634(a)–(b) (2012). The salary for a magistrate judge is 92 percent of the dis-
trict court judges. Id. The statute protects a sitting magistrate judge from a reduction in salary 
during her term. Id. 
66  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
67  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 37 (“Normally, an incumbent mag-
istrate judge who has performed well in the position should be reappointed to another term of 
office.”); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 31, §§ 6.01–6.03. 
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FIGURE 1: ARTICLE I JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS— U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES  
FIGURE 2: ARTICLE III JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS— U.S. DISTRICT JUDGES 
The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 limited the discretion of district judges 
by requiring the involvement of a third party in the screening and prioritizing of 
candidates and by listing certain criteria for selection. However, as we have seen, 
Congress left the district judges with significant influence over the selection pro-
cess and the sole authority to make the final determination of who is appointed.68 
As we consider the identity of those who currently serve as magistrate judges, it 
is important to keep in mind the method by which they gained their positions. 
B. The Work of Magistrate Judges 
At their inception, magistrate judges’ responsibilities largely overlapped 
with those of U.S. commissioners. Thus, magistrate judges had ministerial pow-
ers such as the power to administer oaths and affirmations, issue orders concern-
ing the release or detention of persons pending trial, and take affidavits and dep-
ositions.69 The authority of magistrate judges is largely derived from the district 
judges of their corresponding judicial district, who may designate a magistrate 
judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter—with the exception of certain 
                                                        
68  Smith, supra note 20, at 213. 
69  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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dispositive motions—pending before the court.70 In that same spirit, Congress 
allowed wide latitude in determining the scope of magistrate judges’ responsi-
bilities, enacting that “a magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties 
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”71 
Over time, Congress has refined the assigned and permissible responsibili-
ties of magistrate judges in response to feedback from the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence and rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite concerns regarding consti-
tutionality,72 the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 enlarged the scope of magistrate 
judges’ authorities.73 Congress expanded magistrate judges’ power by allowing 
them to conduct trials in civil cases with the consent of both parties,74 to hear all 
federal misdemeanor cases,75 and to try cases with or without a jury.76 More re-
cently, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 (FCIA) granted limited con-
tempt powers to magistrate judges.77 
In relatively short order, magistrate judges have emerged as an integral part 
of the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court itself has noted, “the role of the mag-
istrate in today’s federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”78 As 
their responsibilities have grown, magistrate judges have grown significantly in 
number. At their inception in 1968, there were only twenty-eight magistrate 
judges.79 That number increased steadily over the following years, hitting 439 in 
1980, 483 in 1993, and 543 in 2003.80 As of 2014, there were 573 U.S. magistrate 
judges including 534 full-time judges and thirty-nine part-time judges.81 In addi-
tion, district courts frequently recall retired magistrate judges, including seventy-
three in 2014.82 
                                                        
70  See id. § 636(b)(1). 
71  See id. § 636(c)(3). 
72  See H.R. 1046, 96th Cong. (1979). Wisconsin Representative, F. James Sensenbrenner 
raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of a judge not contemplated by the Constitution 
entering judgment in matters instead of just making recommendations to the district court 
judge. See id. 
73  See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(2) (2012). 
74  See id. § 636(c). 
75  See id. § 636(a)(3). 
76  See id. § 636(c). 
77  See id. § 636(e). 
78  See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (citing Virgin Islands v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
79  Baker, supra note 9, at 671. 
80  See id. 
81  See Appointments of Magistrate Judges—Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS. http://www. 
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/appointments-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2014 [https: 
//perma.cc/KD6Z-XXSC] (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
82  28 U.S.C. § 636(h) (2012). A 1999 GAO Report found that the demand for recalled judges 
exceeded the available supply and that recalled judges, who serve either 366-day or three-year 
terms, are often asked to renew. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE USE OF 
RECALLED MAGISTRATE AND BANKRUPTCY JUDGES 29 (1999). 
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE ON MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
Much of the existing literature on magistrate judges describes the evolution 
of magistrate judges within the federal system or discusses the efficacy of these 
positions. Early scholarship traces the creation of the federal magistrate system 
and its subsequent amendments,83 and how it fit within Congress’ broader plan 
for civil justice reform.84 
As Congress expanded the potential role of magistrate judges, scholars ex-
amined the implications of these new powers for litigants. Early scholarship 
questioned the creation of federal magistrates, lamenting their encroachment on 
matters historically reserved for Article III district judges,85 and raising the po-
tential separation of power concerns that ensue.86 Others noted the increasing 
responsibilities of magistrate judges without the corresponding institutional sup-
port.87 
As magistrate judges became increasingly involved with pre-trial and trial 
matters, scholars have accepted the role of magistrate judges but argue for greater 
judicial review88 or more explicit consent by parties.89 Others counter that addi-
tional requirements are onerous and inconsistent with Congressional authority.90 
                                                        
83  See, e.g., Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and 
Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1504 
(1995); see also Baker, supra note 9, at 674–80 (explaining the increased role played by mag-
istrate judges in the judicial scheme). 
84  See R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Re-
form, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 799, 800 (1993) (describing how Congress sought to respond to 
the costs and delay inherent in federal court litigation). 
85  See Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magis-
trates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1979) (discussing how magistrate judges 
are performing tasks district judges once performed routinely). 
86  See Brendan Linehan Shannon, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Anal-
ysis for a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253, 274 (1991) (arguing 
that magistrate judges may be encroaching on powers specifically designated for Article III 
judges); see also David A. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands 
of Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433, 454 (1997) (noting that even if a magistrate judge 
were to award damages, the district judge still retains judicial review). 
87  See Michael J. Newman, United States Magistrate Judges: Suggestions to Increase the Ef-
ficiency of Their Civil Role, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 99, 106, 113 (1991) (noting that magistrate 
judges lack the same support by judicial clerks and serve only an eight-year term); see also 
Jeffrey Manske & Mark Osler, Crazy Eyes: The Discernment of Competence by a Federal 
Magistrate Judge, 67 LA. L. REV. 751, 764 (2007) (noting that magistrate judges are asked to 
evaluate a defendant’s mental competence but receive little in the way of training on this mat-
ter). 
88  See Matthew J. Hank, District Court Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Pretrial Detention 
Order, 33 UWLA L. REV. 157, 172 (2001) (noting that every circuit court requires de novo 
review of pretrial detention orders by magistrate judges). 
89  See, e.g., Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of New Contempt Powers for Federal Mag-
istrate-Judges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 567, 570 (2002) (favoring explicit consent by litigants in the 
form of consent forms for magistrate contempt powers). 
90  See, e.g., Durwood Edwards, Can a U.S. District Judge Accept a Felony Plea with a Mag-
istrate Judge’s Recommendation?, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 99 (2004) (arguing that magistrate 
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Of particular concern is that certain types of cases or litigants are reserved to 
magistrate judges, raising constitutional concerns.91 As magistrate judges have 
progressed from case management to matters of adjudication—involving ques-
tions of law as well as fact—recent scholarship has explored the appropriate level 
of judicial review.92 
Empirical inquiries into magistrate judges have made important contribu-
tions but remain few in number. Early work evaluated the effect of court-specific 
initiatives (e.g., a one-case, one-judge system93), but the central focus has been 
on the implicit principal-agent relationship between district and magistrate 
judges. An examination of magistrate opinions between 1991 and 2001 found 
that magistrate judges’ decisions correlated closely with those of their respective 
district judges.94 A study looking at magistrate opinions between 2000 and 2006 
similarly found a positive correlation between the two judge types.95 The agency 
relationship is perhaps not surprising, given that district judges exercise over-
sight over magistrate judges in numerous ways, from appointment to judicial re-
view to re-nomination.96 
III. ATTRIBUTES AND BACKGROUNDS OF JUDGES IN DISTRICT COURTS 
We focus on the demographic and biographical characteristics of the two 
types of judges appointed directly to federal district courts: Article III district 
judges and Article I magistrate judges. For the former, we use data provided by 
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which contains information on every Article 
III judge (district, circuit, Supreme Court), past and present. For each Article III 
judge, the FJC provides the age, gender, ethnicity, education, prior employment, 
and jurisdiction (e.g., district/circuit). We included only active district judges, 
                                                        
judges should be able to accept felony please upon the consent of the defendant, without sub-
mitting a finding of fact and a recommendation to the district court). 
91  See, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro 
Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 484 (2002) (expressing concern 
that pro se cases present unique challenges to the court given their complexity and constitu-
tional issues). 
92  See Koller, supra note 4, at 1558 (recommending the approach taken by the 9th Circuit that 
allows district courts discretion but requires judges to exercise actual discretion). 
93  See James G. Woodward & Michael E. Penick, Expanded Utilization of Federal Magistrate 
Judges: Lessons from the Eastern District of Missouri, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 543, 586 (1999) 
(finding that a one-case, one-judge civil system allowed district courts to resolve cases faster 
while reducing the workload across the district). 
94  See BRUCE A. CARROLL, THE ROLE, DESIGN, AND GROWING IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES 74 (2004) (noting that “there appears to be very little difference between 
the decision-making of the Magistrate Judges and the District Judges. The data display a dif-
ference of only 2.5 percent greater liberal decision-making.”). 
95  See Christina L. Boyd & Jacqueline M. Sievert, Unaccountable Justice? The Decision Mak-
ing of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District Courts, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 249, 269 (2013) 
(finding a correlation when looking at both consent and report and recommendations). 
96  See id. (concluding that judges have “numerous effective mechanisms at their disposal that 
allow them to delegate vast swaths of decision making to magistrates while avoiding many of 
the pitfalls of the moral hazard of principal-agent relationships”). 
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excluding senior district judges because there is no comparable position for mag-
istrate judges. 
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any parallel source of data 
for magistrate judges with the same richness and completeness as for Article III 
judges. Accordingly, we constructed our own from existing public sources. We 
began with any judicial biographies available on an official court site. Most dis-
trict courts, however, do not provide biographies of their judges. Thus, we ex-
panded our sources to include legal directories (including Lexis, Westlaw, 
Bloomberg, Martindale, the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, and the American 
Bench) and other published profiles. Because the provision of this data was vol-
untary, the extent of information varied by judge. We include full-time and part-
time magistrate judges in our analysis. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics, comparing the personal attributes of the 
two groups of judges. The findings include both surprising and unsurprising re-
sults. Because the magistrate judge position can serve as a path to a district judge-
ship, we expected that district judges would be much older at the time of appoint-
ment than magistrate judges. However, district judges were, on average, not even 
four years older than magistrate judges when they were commissioned. We were 
not surprised to find that magistrate judges are much more likely than district 
judges to be white. While non-white judges make up less than half of either type 
of judge, district judges have a much greater minority presence: nearly twice as 
many district judges as magistrate judges are non-white. While the U.S. Judicial 
Conference and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts have strongly encour-
aged districts to hire non-white magistrate judges,97 the diffusion of responsibil-
ity to fulfill this mandate has predictably resulted in less diversity. 
                                                        
97  See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13, at 1–2, 6 (describing the U.S. 
Judicial Conference’s Judiciary Diversity Recruiting and Outreach Program, providing diver-
sity statistics on all court employees, and mentioning specifically that “some measure of pro-
gress is needed to further diversify the ranks of magistrate judges”); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., supra note 31, § 3.02(e) (“To further efforts to achieve diversity in all aspects of the 
magistrate judge selection process, the court is encouraged to appoint a diverse merit selection 
panel.”). 
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTES OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES AND FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES98 
 District Judges Magistrate Judges 
Average Age at Commission 
49.76 
(6.32) 
46.1199 
(8.71) 
Average Current Age 
59.87 
(7.98) 
59.86 
(8.77) 
Women (Percentage) 33% 29% 
Non-White (Percentage) 28%   15%100 
N 623 600 
With respect to legal educational background, both district and magistrate 
judges attended, on average, high-ranking law schools (based on the U.S. News 
and News Report annual law school rankings).101 However, district judges were 
much more likely to attend law schools described as “elite”: district judges were 
more than 50 percent more likely than magistrate judges to attend schools per-
ennially ranked in the top fourteen by the U.S. News and World Report and they 
were three times more likely to attend Yale, Harvard, or Stanford. 
                                                        
98  The U.S. District Judge figures are based on the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical 
Database of Article III judges. The U.S. Magistrate Judge figures are based on the George-
Yoon Article I Biographical Database. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
99  The reported age is based on birth year when available. For those magistrate judges for 
whom birth year was unknown, we estimated birth year based on college graduation year mi-
nus twenty-two, which has a correlation coefficient of .99 percent with actual birth year. We 
were unable to locate birth year or college graduation year for seventy magistrate judges. The 
seventy judges are missing from both the average age at commission and average current age 
figures. 
100  The reported race figure is based on the 591 magistrate judges for whom we know race. 
Race is missing for nine magistrate judges (or 1.5 percent). 
101  We used the law school rankings reported in the 2015 U.S. News ranking of law schools. 
See Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandre-
views.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools [https://perma.cc/K46A-W5ZX] (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2016). 
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TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 
AND FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES102 
 District Judges Magistrate Judges 
Average Rank of Law School At-
tended 
56.09 67.23 
Top 14 Law School (Percentage) 30% 19% 
Home State Law School 55% 63% 
N 623 600 
Table 3 breaks down the professional experience of district judges and mag-
istrate judges. For several reasons, we expected to see marked differences be-
tween the two groups. First, the criteria for selecting magistrate judges would 
seem to favor candidates like prosecutors and public defenders who have sub-
stantial trial experience. However, fewer magistrate judges, as compared to dis-
trict judges, are former prosecutors and the same (low) percentage of both groups 
are former public defenders. The prosecutor finding may reflect the countervail-
ing political incentives in the Article III process to support “law-and-order” ju-
dicial candidates for appointment to the district bench.103 Prosecutors would cer-
tainly appear to voters to be more likely than non-prosecutors (or public 
defenders) to support the government over criminal defendants in criminal cases. 
Elected officials generally have not run on a pro-criminal liberties platform. 
Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that half of district judges previously served as 
prosecutors. Yet, by the same reasoning, our expectations would be that public 
defenders should fare better in the merit panel process than in the political ap-
pointment one. However, public defenders are rarely appointed to magistrate 
judgeships. 
The greatest difference amongst district and magistrate judges was in prior 
judicial experience. Nearly half of all district judges had prior judicial experi-
ence, either as state judges or as Article I federal judges (e.g., bankruptcy, tax, 
and in some instances, as magistrate judges). By comparison, only eleven percent 
of magistrate judges had prior judicial experience. Slightly more magistrate 
judges than district judges served as a judicial clerk. Many of those magistrate 
judges served as career clerks, with several going directly from an elbow clerk-
ship to a magistrate judgeship. We do not see that happen with district judges. 
                                                        
102  The U.S. District Judge figures are based on the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical 
Database of Article III judges. The U.S. Magistrate Judge figures are based on the George-
Yoon Article I Biographical Database. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
103  See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 198–235 (1997) (explaining how President Nixon campaigned 
on a promise of appointing “law-and-order” judges to counteract the Warren Court’s pro-crim-
inal liberties rulings). 
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 
AND FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES104 
 District Judges Magistrate Judges 
Judicial Clerkship 35% 37% 
Prosecutor 50% 38% 
Public Defender 11% 11% 
Prior Judicial Experience 
(Percentage) 
44% 11% 
Private Practice 88% 73% 
N 623 600 
The patterns that emerge on the aggregate level, while interesting, may mask 
the differences that may exist within individual districts. To better observe this 
individual-level variation, we look at each jurisdiction separately and report a 
few of them below. The next two figures (Figures 3 and 4) looks at five districts: 
Central District of California; Alaska; Eastern District of Michigan; Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas, and Connecticut. We chose these specific districts both because 
they collectively represent a broad geographic range, and also the magistrate data 
in these districts were complete.  
                                                        
104  The U.S. District Judge figures are based on the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical 
Database of Article III judges. The U.S. Magistrate Judge figures are based on the George-
Yoon Article I Biographical Database. All prior experience is included, thus totals exceed 100 
percent. 
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FIGURE 3: DEMOGRAPHICS OF SELECTED DISTRICT AND MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
Figure 3 shows the demographic characteristics—gender, ethnicity, and 
age—of the current district and magistrate judges in five markedly different dis-
tricts to look for district-based patterns. But, in all of the districts, women com-
prise roughly the same or a higher fraction of magistrate judges than their female 
counterparts on the district court. Minority judges, in contrast, do not have a 
greater presence as magistrates, compared with district judges. In every district, 
non-white judges comprise roughly the same or a lower percentage of magistrate 
judges than district judges. 
The greatest variation was the relative age at which magistrate and district 
judges joined the bench. In densely populated districts in California, Michigan, 
and Connecticut, the commission age was higher for district judges than it was 
for magistrate judges. In more sparsely populated districts in Alaska and Arkan-
sas, the district judges on average were commissioned at a younger age than 
magistrate judges. While geography appears to explain these divergent patterns, 
less clear is the underlying phenomena. One possibility is that in jurisdictions 
with larger legal labor markets, a magistrate judgeship is viewed more as a mid-
career attainment, while in smaller legal labor markets, this judgeship is more of 
a senior-level attainment, at least for a subset of lawyers. 
District Magistrate
Female 0.26 0.31
Non-White 0.41 0.21
Cmmn Age 52 46
CD-California
District Magistrate
Female 0.25 0.60
Non-White 0.38 0.20
Cmmn Age 47 39
Connecticut
District Magistrate
Female 0.20 0.17
Non-White 0.20 0.17
Cmmn Age 46 51
ED-Arkansas
District Magistrate
Female 0.33 0.40
Non-White 0 0
Cmmn Age 53 53
Alaska
District Magistrate
Female 0.33 0.33
Non-White 0.27 0.33
Cmmn Age 51 47
ED-Michigan
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FIGURE 4: EDUCATION AND PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED DISTRICT AND 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
Figure 4, examining education and prior judicial experience, reveals greater 
differences both within and across judicial districts. Geography appears to influ-
ence the law school which district and magistrate judges attend. The two districts 
where both types of judges attended the highest ranking schools were Connecti-
cut and the Central District of California. Connecticut contains Yale, which the 
U.S. News has ranked number one every year, and the University of Connecticut, 
which historically has been a top fifty law school. It is also in close proximity to 
other high-ranked schools, such as Harvard, Columbia, and New York Univer-
sity. Similarly, the Central District of California contains UCLA and USC, two 
perennial top twenty law schools, and is in the same state as Stanford, Berkeley, 
and other University of California law schools. Accordingly, both magistrate and 
district judges attend higher than average law schools. 
Geography, however, does not explain the Eastern District of Michigan. The 
high average ranking of district judges’ schooling (including over half of them 
attending a top fourteen law school) may reflect that many of them attended the 
University of Michigan, one of the national elite public institutions. Nearly half 
of magistrate judges similarly attended a top fourteen school, but the average 
rank of law school attended is significantly lower. These two figures taken to-
gether reflect a much greater variance in the law schools from which magistrate 
judges graduated. 
District Magistrate
Law School Rank 78 85
Attended T14 0 0.20
Prior Jud. Exp. 0.67 0
Alaska
District Magistrate
Law School Rank 46 34
Attended T14 0.48 0.32
Prior Jud. Exp. 0.52 0
CD-California
District Magistrate
Law School Rank 27 41
Attended T14 0.75 0.40
Prior Jud. Exp. 0.25 0
ConnecticutDistrict Magistrate
Law School Rank 38 82
Attended T14 0.53 0.44
Prior Jud. Exp. 0.53 0.11
ED-Michigan
District Magistrate
Law School Rank 49 62
Attended T14 0.20 0
Prior Jud. Exp. 0.60 0
ED-Arkansas
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An alternative theory to explain any patterns we observe, both within and 
across jurisdictions, is the preferences of the district judges themselves. Since 
district judges ultimately decide who becomes appointed to the magistrate bench 
and the tasks that they perform, their choices may simply reflect their own pref-
erences. Judges in some districts may prefer to choose magistrates consistent 
with their own background and experiences, while others may opt for judges with 
distinct and perhaps complementary backgrounds. 
CONCLUSION 
This article is meant as a first step to understand the composition of magis-
trate judges, who provide an increasingly important but enduringly underex-
plored role in the functioning of the federal judiciary. We have explored the pos-
sible relationship between the selection process and the composition of the two 
separate district court benches. In future work, we will extend our study to con-
sider other judges as well as how the composition of the bench influences mag-
istrate judge performance. 
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